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Abstract
To what extent is an increased stringency of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) system
apt to stimulate research cooperation between developed and emerging economies? To ad-
dress this question, we empirically investigate how international joint research projects in
the pharmaceutical sector are affected by the regime of IPR in force in the two countries
involved in the collaboration. Looking at the joint signature of both patent documents and
scientific articles by researchers located in developed and emerging markets, our investigation
indicates two opposite effects: joint publications are fostered by stricter IPR rules, whereas
joint patents are discouraged. A recently proposed theory provides a plausible rationale for
this apparently contradicting result.
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To be successful in the creation of new knowledge substantial research and development (R&D)
investments are needed. The uncertainty associated with the revenues from this type of in-
vestments has motivated the introduction of different policy interventions with the objective
of strengthening the incentives to innovate. In particular, based on the general idea that sees
innovation as the driving force of economic growth, policy makers around the world have set a
common strategy to protect Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), which has been defined in the
multilateral trade agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).
Extended to all World Trade Organization (WTO) members, the new rules impose a minimum
standard in the protection and enforcement of the IPR, with the purpose of encouraging coop-
eration among countries (WTO, 2016).
In this paper we examine the role played by IPR protection in research cooperation between
developed and emerging market economies, by exploiting the latest change in the intellectual
property regulation introduced within the TRIPs agenda. Established in 1995 in all developed
economies, this radical reform provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the effects of a change
in the stringency of IPR protection on cooperative research projects. Interestingly, the change in
the intellectual property regime was ratified differently across countries. Contrary to developed
economies, developing countries were granted a longer transition period up to 2000, with an
additional extension until 1 January 2005 for the protection in technological areas that had not
been protected before the TRIPS Agreement.1 The pharmaceutical sector is one such area, and
it represents the focus of our research, which assesses the effects of the new intellectual property
law on joint research projects between developed and emerging market economies.
We adopt a dual approach to test whether a sharper set of institutions designed to protect
the IPR was able to spur international research collaborations in the pharmaceutical domain.
Specifically, we examine the dynamics that characterize collaborations both in science and tech-
nology measured by the number of publications and the number of patents jointly signed by
researchers located in developed and emerging market economies. Focusing on both patents and
publications, our proposed method of analysis gives us the opportunity to explore in detail the
use of open science, which is commonly adopted to disclose knowledge in industrial sectors where
the IPR protection is quite strong, as in the pharmaceutical domain (Cockburn and Henderson,
1998).
To disentangle the role of the change in IPR regime, our empirical analysis relies on a gravity
model approach. The distribution of knowledge and expertise across countries is determined by
gravity forces which in our model are dependent on the size of scientific and technological capabil-
ities of each country. Hence, given its tractability and parsimonious representation of countries
economic interactions, a gravity model provides us with a suitable approach to study the impact
of the new set of IPR regulations on research collaborations at the international level. We concen-
trate on the pharmaceutical sector as the leading example of a science-based sector, which widely
relies on IPR to capture returns from R&D investments (see Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000;
DiMasi, Grabowski and Vernon, 2004; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). To secure R&D rev-
1As an example, Brazil, India and Turkey employed the full transition period, before granting product patents
on pharmaceuticals in 2005 (Hamdan-Livramento, 2009).










enues this industry has historically made use of a variety of instruments other than IPR protec-
tion (i.e. secrecy, licensing agreements, etc.). However, when a tighter intellectual property sys-
tem was adopted, the number of new drugs launched increased (see Cockburn, Lanjouw and Schankerman,
2016; Kyle and McGahan, 2012), underlying the pivotal role played by the intellectual property
protection for this sector (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). Moreover, since the drug develop-
ment process depends heavily on the advances in different related scientific areas, cooperative
research agreements have been widely employed as an institutional mechanism to avoid du-
plication of costs (among others see Katsoutacos and Ulph, 1998; Katz, 1986; Lin and Zhou,
2013).
The presence of a formal system of IPR rules has proved to be an important source of in-
centives to new R&D investments, generating positive effects on a country’s economic growth
(Falvey, Foster and Greenaway, 2006; Liu, 2016). For higher-income countries, a tighter IPR
regime safeguards the returns on R&D investments, ensuring a more stable monopoly status; for
lower-income countries, instead, the presence of a clear set of rules provides a safe environment
able to attract new foreign investments. The literature on the impact of IPR reforms on indus-
trial development suggests that firms tend to deploy more technology in those countries where a
tougher system of IPR protection is in place (Branstetter, Fisman, Foley and Saggi, 2011). An
ambiguous intellectual property system, indeed, discourages R&D co-investment between rivals
(Czarnitzki, Hussinger and Schneider, 2015), whereas stronger regimes of intellectual property
rights facilitate technology transfer (Kanwar, 2012). Evaluating the effects of the TRIPs agree-
ment on new medical treatments, Kyle and McGahan (2012) confirm the prediction that a clear
system of IPR yields an increase of R&D investments in developed economies. On the other
hand, Qian (2007) shows that the enactment of a stricter patent law by itself does not foster
R&D expenditures and innovation in the pharmaceutical sector, since other characteristics such
as the level of education and the degree of economic freedom turn out to be more crucial.
In the scientific domain, although joint co-authorships are motivated by different goals
(Cockburn and Henderson, 2000), a clear system of rules able to protect intellectual property
is considered of a great importance. Academic articles often report results about important
advancements for specific projects that are developed jointly with different researchers and in-
stitutions. In the presence of an imperfect mechanism of intellectual property appropriability,
scientists may be refrained from developing collaborations with their peers located in countries
unable to guarantee a secure environment to protect their own IPRs (Gans, Murray and Stern,
2017). Although patents and other forms of intellectual property protection fortifies incentives
to undertake risky research projects, their own existence may jeopardize their advancement in
science when a plurality of right holders owns a specific discovery, with consequences on the
diffusion and utilization of scientific knowledge (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).
Our paper contributes to the long-standing debate on the role of intellectual property in inter-
national cooperative research along three dimensions. First, we separately analyse and compare
the two different domains in which research cooperation takes place, that is technological and
scientific innovation. Second, to capture as broadly as possible the actual degree of the new IPR
system in a country we make use of two complementary measures that quantify respectively
the objective and the subjective level of such a protection. Third, we adopt a novel empirical










strategy based on a gravity framework where the attraction force of each country is represented
by the existing stock of technological and scientific knowledge. Our results indicate that a
more rigorous system of IPR protection has yielded two distinct outcomes. On the one hand,
we uncover a negative impact on technological collaborations between developed and emerging
market economies, despite a simultaneous considerable rise in the number of new patent ap-
plications at the international level.2 On the other hand, we find that scientific collaborations
have significantly benefitted from the new IPR rules, providing new evidence of the actual im-
pact of the legal protection on the output of scientific research (see Heller and Eisenberg, 1998;
Lach and Schankerman, 2008; Murray and Stern, 2007). These two apparently contradicting
findings are consistent with the theory that highlights how the disclosure of unknown informa-
tion to the public domain may be used strategically to curb competitors patent applications
(Baker and Mezzetti, 2005; Ponce, 2008). Our conclusions are robust to alternative model spec-
ifications and definitions of the explanatory variables. Moreover, to corroborate our results, we
present a placebo estimation in a sector where IPR protection is expected to be neutral.
The structure of the paper is the following. Data and measures are described in the next
Section. Details on the adopted methodology and our empirical strategy are explained in Section
3. Results and robustness checks are reported in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively, whereas
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and measures
We collected annual data from publicly available databases for a panel of 17 × 7 country pairs,
including 17 developed economies (i.e. Canada, Japan, Switzerland, USA, and 13 European
countries)3 and 7 emerging market economies (i.e. Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, South
Korea, and Turkey).4 As our goal is to empirically assess the effects of the change in the strength
of IPR protection on international research cooperation, our dependent variable captures alter-
natively technological and scientific collaborations between developed and emerging economies,
measured by the number of joint patents and joint publications. Our variables are constructed
employing ad hoc queries on FreePatentsOnline search engine for inventions (patents) related to
pharmaceuticals, and from ISI Web of Knowledge for the peer-reviewed research articles pub-
lished about health-related subjects.5 Information on patents and scientific publications has
been obtained over the period 1978-2011.
2See for details, http://www.wipo.int/publications/en/details.jsp?id=4138
3For the European countries, we consider EU 15 which includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom,
where the Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) has been considered as a unique entity.
4The selected developing countries were originally identified by a leading consultant firm in the health care
industry as the emerging pharmaceutical markets (IMS Health; see http://www.imshealth.com). These countries
are included among the developing countries by the World Bank with the exception of South Korea, which is listed
as high-income country since 1997 (details on http://data.worldbank.org/about/country- classifications/country-
and-lending-groups).
5The FreePatentsOnline search service enables full-text search of published international patent applications
from 1978 (more details on http://www.freepatentsonline.com), whereas for ISI Web of Knowledge information
has been extracted from Web of Science database (see http://apps.isiknowledge.com). Since journals publish
scholarly material in a different variety of matters, we confine our data to research articles that are defined
by their health-related contents. Particularly, we consider articles containing the following terms: pharma OR
biotech OR drug OR therapeutic OR disease OR medical.












































Figure 1: International R&D collaboration in (a) patents, with count based on applicants’
location; (b) patents, with count based on inventors’ location; and (c) publications. Sample
average between (i) developed economies - dotted line, right axes; (ii) emerging market economies
- dashed line, left axes; and (iii) developed economies and emerging market economies - solid
line, left axes.
In order to identify pharmaceutical patents, we consider the two International Patent Classi-
fication (IPC) classes A61K and A61P.6 An international technological collaboration is counted
if a patent is jointly signed by two (or more) applicants (those who hold full rights to the
innovation) located in two different countries. As a complementary measure, we also count in-
ternational technological collaborations on the basis of the geographical location of the inventors
(those who have conceived a particular innovation). Results obtained with the two measures
are broadly consistent. Due to the scope of our analysis, we use international patents, which
refer to the applications submitted to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
i.e. patents granted under the Paris Convention Treaty (PCT), as this system is designed to
potentially protect innovations both in developed and emerging countries.
As we are interested in the dynamics of total research output in the pharmaceutical sector, we
consider all active researchers in both academia and industry. Determination of their location is
6The class A61K includes “preparations for medical, dental, or toilet purposes”, whereas the class A61P
considers the “therapeutic activity of chemical compounds or medicinal preparations”. For further details see:
http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/.










made possible by the fact that the Web of Science database reports the affiliation of all authors
listed in a publication, including their full address. Thus, a scientific collaboration between
two countries is considered if the publication is jointly signed by researchers located in these
countries. In the recent years, co-ownerships both in science and technology have shown a
positive trend at the international level (Ductor, 2015).





End of transition pe-
riod for pharma
Brazil 1995 1997 2005
China 2001 1993 2001
India 1995 2003 2005
Mexico 1995 1991 2000
Russia 2012 2008 2012
South Korea 1995 1997 2000
Turkey 1995 1999 2005
Note: Data about WTO memberships have been retrieved from
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm. Details on the intro-
duction of the patent law in our emerging market economies: Brazil see Schulz and Wu
(2004); China see Chengsi (1998); India see IPO (2017); Mexico see Sandoval and Leung
(1993); Russia see Galtsova (2008); South Korea see Erstling and Strom (2009); Turkey
see Suluk (2018). Date about the transition period for pharmaceuticals patents are
retrieved from Kyle and Qian (2014).
In order to explore the pattern of collaborative research in our sample of countries, Figure
1 plots the average number of collaborations per year, measured on the basis of patents, both
applicants (panel a) and inventors (panel b), and on the basis of scientific publications (panel c),
distinguishing whether these involve (i) developed economies, (ii) emerging market economies,
or (iii) both. The reference year is the application (filing) date for patents and the publication
date for scientific articles. We observe that patents involving a collaboration between developed
and emerging market economies have increased quite steadily since 1995, but with different
dynamics. In the case of patents, a downward trend is observed since 2006. The decrease in the
number of patents in the last four years can be partially explained by the time lag between the
filing and the publication (acceptance) date. The dynamics of publications is characterized by a
constant growth rate across all three groups of countries. Among the emerging economies, China
has always the highest number of international collaborations, followed by India for patents and
Brazil for scientific publications. It is interesting to note that, despite in some cases a patent law
already being in place, the majority of the emerging economies in our sample have opted for the
use of the entire transition period for the pharmaceutical sector, updating their IP system years
after the signature of the TRIPS agreement. Details are reported in Table 1, which lists for each
emerging market economy in our sample the date of entry into the WTO, the introduction for
the first time of a general patent law, and the end of the transition period for pharmaceuticals,
respectively.
To gauge the degree of IPR protection in each country two complementary indices are consid-










ered. First, we employ the broadly used Ginarte-Park index, which rates the intellectual property
(IP) protection and enforcement compliance for each country by aggregating five separate scores
on the degree of coverage. Several objective criteria are adopted by this index to capture the
strength of protection that a nation is able to provide, including membership to international
treaties, duration of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and restrictions (Ginarte and Park,
1997; Park, 2008). Taking into account the length of protection, the mechanisms for enforcing
patent rights, and the evolution of the international patent laws, the Ginarte-Park index mea-
sures the overall strength of the legal structure and security of the IPR system. Allowing for
difference in effective protection across countries, the Ginarte-Park index varies from zero to five
with higher values of the index indicating stronger protection. The index is available at five-year
intervals over a long time span (1960 up to 2005).
As an additional dimension of the strength of IPR, we adopt a measure based on the Execu-
tive Opinion Survey provided by the World Economic Forum (Gwartney, Lawson and Norton,
2008), henceforth referred to as EOS. We have drawn information on the index value over the
years 2000-2009,7 and one point value is also available for the year 1995. This index captures the
subjective assessment of the IPR level expressed by executives of (mainly large) firms located
in the dominant sectors of the economy. The positive low correlation between the two indices
(about 0.45 and 0.30 for respectively developed and emerging market economies) mirrors the dif-
ference between the actual legal protection and the perceived level of protection for IPR among
practitioners (Gwartney, Lawson and Norton, 2008). In Table 2 we report basic statistics of the
two indices based on our sample, decomposing the total variance in the between and within
components.8
Table 2: Objective and subjective measures of the strength of the protection of IPR
Ginarte-Park EOS
Emerging Developed Emerging Developed
markets economies markets economies
Mean 3.322 4.445 4.048 7.467
Total variability 0.878 0.283 1.091 1.184
Between variability 0.560 0.231 0.991 1.088
Within variability 0.699 0.171 0.580 0.529
Growth 1995-2000 0.505 0.058 -0.029 0.157
Growth 2000-2005 0.154 0.012 0.195 -0.024
As expected both indices are higher in developed economies than in emerging market economies.
7 In order to enhance comparability among the two indices, in the analysis we only use information on the
Ginarte-Park index for the years 2000 and 2005.
8Let πit be the measure of patent protection for country i at time t. The total variability is computed as





2/(NT ) with π̄ being the overall average of πit. With π̄i identifying the
average over time of the observations on country i, between variability captures variability across countries, more











2/(NT ), capturing the variation over time of the index at the country level.










However, the two indices exhibit quite different dynamics in terms of average growth rate. The
value of within and between variability reveals that our sample of countries differs in terms of
the level of IPR protection, and changes have occurred within countries in the analysed time
frame. Over the period 1995-2005, the Ginarte-Park index has remained fairly stable for devel-
oped countries, whereas it has increased considerably for emerging economies. As developing
economies were given up to 2005 to comply with the new IPR regulations, the different dynamics
are most likely due to the extensive normative changes that occurred in the IPR system for this
latter group of countries. On the contrary, a change in trend is observed for EOS index over
the two time periods for both groups of countries. For developed economies, a growth in the
perceived IPR protection is observed over the period 1995-2000, whereas for emerging countries
the EOS index increases at a later stage. More likely this effect is due to the time lag needed
for emerging economies to update their legal system (see among others Maskus and Penubarti,
2012). The negative sign in the growth for both set of countries, at different stages, reflects a
decrease in trust in the protection of their own IPRs. In the next Section we show how the
difference between the perceived and the observed IPR protection is decisive for our results.
3 Empirical approach: a gravity model of R&D cooperation
Our analysis is based on the use of a standard gravity model, which has been successfully
employed to study the determinants of international flows between nations, as defined by specific
economic forces of either the origin or the destination country (Anderson and Van Wincoop,
2003). More specifically, based on the Newton’s law of universal gravitation, a standard gravity
model explains the behavior of bilateral flows between two countries as proportional to their
masses and inversely proportional to the distance between them.
In our gravity equation, besides masses, we include the two measures of the strength of IPR
protection to investigate whether the increased stringency of IPR protection in the emerging
market economies has attracted collaborative research partnerships with the developed world in
the pharmaceutical sector.
Indicating by Cijt the number of (technological or scientific) collaborations between country
i (developed) and country j (emerging) at time t (year), our gravity equation is specified as
follows:
E[Cijt|Xijt, αij ] = exp(X
′
ijtβ + τt + αij), (1)
where
X ′ijtβ = β0 + β1 ln Mit−1 + β2 ln Mjt−1 + β3 ln IPRit + β4 ln IPRjt
with Mit−1 and Mjt−1 the masses of, respectively, country i and j at time t − 1,
9 and IPRkt
measuring the IPR protection in country, k for k = i, j at time t.10 Following the Schumpeterian
9One-year lag is considered in order to avoid endogeneity, as masses at time t also include cooperation at time
t. Moreover, for countries with zero patents and publications we add a one to the masses Mkt (k = i, j) when
calculating the logarithm.
10Note that our dependent variable measures bilateral collaborations between two countries. Country pairs are
counted only once. All explanatory variables are expressed in logarithms, and two separate models are considered
in which IPR is measured using the Ginarte-Park index and the EOS index. Concerns may arise about the
endogeneity of the two IPR indices, as the level of IPR protection has been historically chosen by countries
fostered by domestic innovators or when achieving a rather high level of development (Qian, 2007). However, in










tradition, the masses Mkt are measured alternatively by the total number of patents or publica-
tions in the pharmaceutical domain to gauge the stock of technological and scientific capabilities
at the country level (Griliches, 1990). Thus, the dynamics of the stock knowledge is defined as
Mkt = Pkt + (1 − δ)Mkt−1, (2)
with Pkt representing the new technological or scientific flow (respectively, the number of patents
or publications) of country k at time t (k = i, j), where we set δ = 13.11%, identified as the
industry-specific estimated depreciation rate estimated by Park and Park (2006). Because the
distance between our two countries is time invariant, it will be modeled as a fixed effect. Hence,
a dyad fixed effect αij is included in the equation to control for all observable and unobservable
dyad-specific characteristics that are invariant over time, e.g. the distance between country i
and j. Besides distance, gravity regressions usually include a set of controls such as the existence
of colonial links, use of a common language (e.g. Picci, 2010) that are effectively accounted for
by the presence of αij.
11 Time dummies (τt) are included in all specifications to account for
time-specific effects affecting all collaborations. Descriptive statistics of the variables included
in these baseline regressions are reported in Table 3.
In order to estimate the parameters of a standard gravity equation, the model (3) is cus-
tomarily log-linearized and ordinary least squares is applied. This approach, however, has been
recently criticized, as the use of the log-linear form of the gravity equation may produce in-
consistent estimates of the model elasticities when heteroschedasticity is present in the original
equation (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, 2011). Hence, we follow Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2011)
and apply the Poisson analytical approach to study the effect of the change in the strength of
the IPR system on technological and scientific research cooperations. The Poisson regression
framework also allows researchers to deal with the possibility of zero flows between two countries,
which could be common in the current framework, and in our sample (Silva and Tenreyro, 2011).
In order to estimate the model parameters, we exploit the availability of pre-sample informa-
tion on the dependent variable and employ the pre-sample mean estimator (PME) proposed by
Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1995) and Blundell, Griffith and Windmeijer (2002). This
estimator has the virtue of allowing both correlation between the fixed effects αij and the vari-
ables included in the regression, as well as the presence of predetermined variables in the equation
(see Windmeijer, 2008). Allowing for feedback effects is quite important in our context, because
the collaboration at time t between two countries likely produces beneficial effects on the pro-
duction of knowledge (and therefore on the masses) of both countries in subsequent years. The
estimator has also been shown to perform well in small samples and in the case of persistent
variables (Blundell, Griffith and Windmeijer, 2002). Consistent estimates of the model param-
eters in equation (3) are obtained by using the pre-sample average of the dependent variable as
the case of TRIPS, Kyle and McGahan (2012) argue that developing and least developed countries did strengthen
the level of IPR protection only because they expected large benefits from the membership in the WTO (see also
Shin, Lee and Park, 2016). Hamdan-Livramento (2009) also examines the TRIPS agreement and concludes that
the implementation of the IP reform is an external factor which is not completely dependent on the level of
economic development.
11In Section 5 we present a set of robustness checks where additional control variables have been employed.










Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the regressions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Patents (assignees)
Cij 5.037 19.306 0.000 173
ln Mi 7.089 2.174 0.965 10.925
ln Mj 5.250 2.455 0.000 9.253
Patents (inventors)
Cij 2.098 9.130 0.000 184
ln Mi 7.015 1.768 1.996 10.847
ln Mj 5.574 1.516 1.747 7.964
Publications
Cij 63.792 171.886 0.000 3199
ln Mi 10.083 1.212 6.916 13.043
ln Mj 9.156 0.713 7.819 11.959
Protection of IPR
ln EOSi 2.007 0.173 1.482 2.241
ln EOSj 1.363 0.276 0.642 1.988
ln GPi 1.510 0.044 1.379 1.585
ln GPj 1.297 0.155 0.819 1.466
Note: Cij , Mi and Mj are the sample means of the corre-
sponding variables in equation (3). EOSk, and GPk with
k = i, j are the sample means of the EOS and Ginarte-Park
indices, respectively.
a proxy for the fixed effect αij . The estimated model is therefore defined as
Cijt = exp(X
′
ijtβ + τt + γ ln C̄ijP ) + ǫijt, (3)
with C̄ijP = 1/P
∑P−1
s=0 Cij,0−s being the pre-sample mean of the dependent variable and γ is a
parameter to be estimated.12 Standard errors are estimated using the methodology proposed
by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) that allows cluster-robust inference in the case of non-
nested two-way clustering.13
In the light of the data reported in Figure 1, avoiding problems arising from the application-
grant lag, for patents the estimation period spans the period 2000-2008, whereas for publications
we consider the full time frame from 2000 to 2009.
12 In order to avoid removing observations with zero pre-sample mean C̄ijP , we added one to the pre-sample
counts of collaborations. Given the observed dynamics in the evolution of the dependent variables, the pre-sample
average is computed over the time period 1995-1998.
13In our analysis, it is not possible to assume independence among the dyads. As an example, dyad ij is
correlated with dyad ik even if j 6= k, due to the presence of country i in both dyads.











The results of our estimation for both technological and scientific collaborations within the
health-related framework are displayed in Table 4. The Table is organized as follows. In the first
four columns after the description of our regressors, we report the estimates for the bilateral
technological research cooperation measured by the number of joint patents, considering the
location of both the applicants (second and third columns) and the inventors (fourth and fifth
columns). In the last two columns, instead, we present the estimates for the scientific research
cooperation between two countries, measured by the number of joint international publications
(sixth and seventh columns). The coefficients on the masses Mit and Mjt are significant and
have the expected positive sign, indicating that the larger is the knowledge base of the two
countries the stronger is their “attraction force” with respect to research collaborations.
Table 4: Main estimation results of our baseline gravity model
Patents Patents Publications
(applicants) (inventors)
IPR measure G-P EOS G-P EOS G-P EOS
ln Mit−1 0.767
∗∗∗ 0.149 1.224∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.191) (0.149) (0.208) (0.047) (0.033)
ln Mjt−1 1.049
∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗ 0.915∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.261) (0.062) (0.084) (0.181) (0.180)
ln IPRit -29.042
∗∗ 1.881∗ 6.729 0.844∗∗ -2.466∗∗∗ -0.232
(11.296) (0.994) (5.140) (0.342) (0.934) (0.270)
ln IPRjt -4.085
∗∗∗ -0.3883 -1.943∗∗∗ -0.4755 1.226∗∗∗ 0.4642∗∗∗
(0.761) (0.790) (0.331) (0.486) (0.250) (0.147)
C̄ijP 1.634
∗∗∗ 1.329∗∗∗ -0.074 0.296 0.975∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗
(0.390) (0.313) (0.389) (0.297) (0.046) (0.075)
Constant 37.069∗∗∗ -9.686∗∗∗ -21.731∗∗∗ -12.876∗∗∗ -4.424∗∗∗ -6.785∗∗∗
(15.368) (2.569) (8.140) (1.620) (0.545) (0.936)
N. obs. 238 1071 238 1071 238 1190
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance at ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗
10%.
Considering the level of IPR protection in the emerging market (country j), we find that its
effect on joint publications is positive and significant, using either of the two indices (see the
last two columns). As for technological collaborations (joint patents), we always find a negative
impact of the IPR index in emerging markets, but this is statistically significant only when using
the G-P measure. This difference in significance clearly reflects the two inherently different
approaches used to construct the two indices, the observed versus the perceived protection of










the intellectual property rights.14
When we analyse the IPR level in the developed country (country i), we find that this has
a negative impact on scientific collaborations, using either of the two indices, but again this
emerges as significant only using the G-P measure (sixth column). The effect on the number of
joint patents, instead, is always positive except in one case, and with ambiguous significance.15
To what extent are these estimated signs sensible, or at least can we provide an intuitive inter-
pretation for this strong evidence of opposing effects on the two types of research collaboration?
Since developed countries are characterized by more advanced and effective legal institutions,
which ensure a higher and more certain standard of protection (see Table 3), it is very likely that
the level of IPR protection in the emerging markets plays a more determinant role, influencing
research collaborations between countries. Thus, focusing on this latter, we believe that the
estimated opposite sign in the effect on patents and publications can be interpreted in light of
the recent theoretical models underlying the dual nature of scientific knowledge. Following the
“Pasteur’s Quadrant” terminology (for example Stokes, 1997), it is believed that the distinction
between basic and applied research tends to vanish in the long run and an increasing num-
ber of joint research projects are undertaken with the simultaneous goals of creating a product
that has a commercial value (patents), and broadening the scientific knowledge (publications)
(Gans, Murray and Stern, 2017). This is particularly relevant in a dynamic setting where inno-
vations are both sequential and cumulative, for which the use of upstream patent is less desirable
because it may inhibit future innovations (Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Merges and Nelson, 1990;
Scotchmer, 1991). Our results seem to suggest that when the legal background is secured by
the introduction of clear rules, the use of patents in pharmaceuticals is likely to be postponed
to later stages in order to favor further efforts in the research process that is triggered by the
initial idea (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). As the realization of research projects is increasingly
undertaken in more complex organizations, where researchers necessarily interact with different
economic agents (i.e. governments, private firms and universities), the conditions under which
knowledge is disseminated can follow less traditional patterns (Gans, Murray and Stern, 2017).
From another perspective, it is not uncommon for firms to act tactically by disclosing in-
formation on an invention in the form of a defensive publication. This strategy allows firms to
create prior art that might stop other competitors from patenting by building up further barriers
that jeopardizes rivals’ patent application (Baker and Mezzetti, 2005). We stress that not only
is there no evidence of a positive impact of strenghtening IPR on the number of collaborative
patents, but this relationship, if anything, appears to be negative. While this seems surprising
at a first glance, it can easily find justification in the fact that the presence of a clear system of
rules on IPR makes unnecessary the recourse to a patent to protect an idea in its early stages.
Since the disclosure of new ideas depends on a complex and interacting set of institutions, once
a minimum set of rules has been defined, economic agents have more incentives to cooperate at
the international level. A further confirmation of this interpretation can be derived by observing
14 As the WTO membership of a country might influence the expectations on the actual IPR protection, we have
re-run the estimations removing those observations for Russia and China. As reported in Table 1, China become
a WTO member in December 2001, and Russian Federation is a WTO member since August 2012. Results are
qualitative the same.
15We are interested mainly on the sign and the significance of the effects of the IPR protection, given that the
exact magnitude of the coefficients depends on the specific index adopted.










in Table 4 that a significant negative coefficient is only obtained using the objective measure of
IPR protection, which captures the strength of the actual legal system in force, and not using
the alternative subjective index.
5 Robustness analysis
In this Section a set of robustness checks is proposed which aims at exploring the sensitivity of
our results to different model specifications. First, we consider different definitions of masses to
control for the dynamics of knowledge accumulation. Second, in order to check for alternative
potential explanations of the observed pattern in patents and publications, we include addi-
tional control variables to our baseline specification, and in particular we assess the statistical
relevance of a complete series of potentially important variables. Third, as research projects
in the pharmaceutical sector may take several years, we experiment with various lags the IPR
protection indices considered in the analysis. Finally, we run a set of “placebo” regressions for
the case of scientific collaborations in the field of Economics, building on the idea that a tighter
intellectual property system should not affect research collaborations in fields where patenting
is not involved.
Table 5: Estimation results using a different definition of mass
Patents Patents Publications
(applicants) (inventors)
















Constant 39.160∗∗∗ -20.398∗∗ -5.560∗∗∗
(13.821) (8.015) (0.420)
N. obs. 238 238 238
Note: Statistical significance at ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.










5.1 Different definition of mass
In the baseline regression, an industry-specific constant depreciation rate of 13.11% was con-
sidered for computing the stock of knowledge as defined in equation (2). Because the level of
IPR protection can influence the dynamics of knowledge accumulation, in particular its rate of
obsolescence, we set a depreciation rate that is inversely related to the country’s IPR index when
computing the stock of knowledge as in equation (2), letting countries with higher IPR have a
lower depreciation rate, and, conversely, countries with lower IPR to have a higher depreciation
rate. To assess the level of IPR stringency at the country level, we use historical data on IPR
protection, provided by Park (2008). More specifically, letting πt be the historical index at time
t, the constant depreciation rate δ in equation (2) is replaced by δ̃t = 0.1311 − (πt − πt)/100,
and the corresponding stock of knowledge is identified by M̃kt (k = i, j).
16
As long time series are only available for the Ginarte-Park index, we do not consider EOS
when M̃ is included in the regressions. The results are reported in Table 5. Once again,
we observe a dual effect of a more stringent protection of the intellectual property right on
cooperative technological (patents) and scientific (publications) collaborations, confirming the
results of our baseline regression (Table 4).
Next, following the recent theoretical prediction suggesting that firms strategically tend to
adopt a disclosure regime based on the simultaneous use of patents and papers, i.e. patent-
paper pairs, (Gans, Murray and Stern, 2017), we explore the possibility of cross-fertilization
between patents and publications by including both measures of mass in the same regression.
Relying on the distinctive differences between the patent and scientific publication system, with
this alternative set of regressions we explore the issue of whether technological collaborations
are related to the attractiveness in science (publications), and, vice versa, whether scientific
collaborations are related to the technological capabilities of the country. Results are reported
in Table 6, where MPatkt and MPubkt with (k = i, j) identify the two measures of mass
computed on the basis of, respectively, patent and publication.17 Again, results appear to be
robust, displaying the same dual effect of IPR protection that we found in the main estimation.
5.2 Additional control variables
To allow for alternative determinants of technological and scientific collaborations in pharma-
ceuticals, we add control variables that reflect the state of the art of both basic and advanced
research in each country. In particular, in order to control for domestic research intensity, we
include the amount of R&D expenditure as a fraction of GDP (RD), and the number of re-
searchers in R&D per million people (Res). Moreover, we use the FDI inflow as a fraction of
GDP (FDI), and we simultaneously control for alternative measures of the “attraction force”
of both countries.
As a second set of potentially relevant variables for research collaborations among countries,
we explore the relevance of government expenditure in education as a fraction of GDP (Edu),
as well as the Economic Summary Index, reported by the Fraser Institute, as an indicator of the
16Notice that we have tried also different Ginarte-Park index cut-off, obtaining the same qualitative results.
17 In the following sets of regression, we consider the depreciation rate of our baseline specification, i.e. δ =
13.11%.










Table 6: Estimation results including both measures of mass
Patents Patents Publications
(applicants) (inventors)
IPR measure G-P EOS G-P EOS G-P EOS
ln MPatit−1 0.244 -0.037 1.589
∗∗ 1.146∗∗ -0.051 -0.038
(0.306) (0.214) (0.680) (0.528) (0.049) (0.072)
ln MPatjt−1 0.782
∗ 0.459∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.068 0.015
(0.431) (0.190) (0.067) (0.087) (0.059) (0.051)
ln MPubit−1 1.021
∗ 0.341 -0.481 -0.182 0.297∗∗ 0.261∗∗
(0.602) (0.330) (0.719) (0.449) (0.119) (0.104)
ln MPubjt−1 0.561 1.199
∗∗∗ -0.356 0.435 0.487∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗
(0.505) (0.284) (0.241) (0.364) (0.139) (0.162)
ln IPRit -31.880
∗∗∗ 2.275∗∗ 7.127 0.739∗ -2.636∗∗∗ -0.171
(11.166) (1.039) (5.215) (0.435) (0.800) (0.363)
ln IPRjt -3.621
∗∗ 0.277 -2.379∗∗∗ -0.399 1.202∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗
(1.428) (0.616) (0.804) (0.446) (0.187) (0.149)
C̄ijP 1.477
∗∗∗ 1.350∗∗∗ -0.106 0.397 0.952∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.337) (0.354) (0.274) (0.042) (0.085)
Constant 30.925∗∗ -20.784∗∗∗ -16.941∗∗ -14.876∗∗∗ -3.893∗∗∗ -6.871∗∗∗
(12.399) (2.002) (7.842) (3.011) (0.488) (2.377)
N. obs. 238 1071 238 1071 238 1071
Note: Statistical significance at ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
overall business climate in a given country (BC).18
Furthermore, we acknowledge that the specific historical period of our sample is characterized
by a considerable diffusion of the Internet (within our panel of countries, the average number of
users per 100 people increased from 24.37 in 2000 to 66.06 in 2010). Hence, given the Internet’s
dominant role in communication, especially after the introduction of software which allows more
easily video conference calls (e.g. Skype), we include the log-number of Internet users per 100
residents (Intkt with k = i, j) to control for its influence in facilitating overseas cooperation.
19
Finally, in order to control for the commercial proximity within the pharmaceutical sector
between the two countries that are part of the bilateral research cooperation, the sum of this
sector imports and exports is considered (as percentage of GDP, Trade).20 We report in Table
7 and Table 8 the analysis on technological collaborations, and in Table 9 and in Table 10 the
analysis on scientific collaborations. To save space, in the case of patents only counts on the
18For complete details see http://www.freetheworld.com/.
19The variables RDkt, Reskt, Edukt, FDIkt, and Intkt where k = i, j have been extracted from the World
Bank statistics, see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. Notice that these variables refer to the overall economy
and are not limited to the pharmaceutical industry.
20Trade data in pharmaceuticals have been extracted from the OECD, Bilateral Trade in Goods by Industry
and End-use.










Table 7: Estimation results for patents using additional control variables and EOS index
Patents (applicants)
IPR measure EOS EOS EOS EOS EOS EOS EOS
ln Mit−1 0.471
∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗ 0.161 0.140 0.277 0.329 0.700∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.178) (0.219) (0.169) (0.197) (0.234) (0.192)
ln Mjt−1 0.926
∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ 1.170∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.164) (0.372) (0.485) (0.178) (0.070) (0.348)
ln IPRit 3.411
∗∗∗ 1.718∗∗ 2.615∗ 1.199 0.969 0.584 0.188
(1.160) (0.842) (1.448) (0.961) (1.141) (0.909) (1.088)
ln IPRjt 0.395 -0.430
∗∗ -0.425 0.201 -0.284 0.713∗∗∗ -0.609




































∗∗∗ 1.044∗∗∗ 1.318∗∗∗ 1.195∗∗∗ 1.326∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗ 1.663∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.213) (0.409) (0.301) (0.340) (0.272) (0.521)
Constant -14.264∗∗∗ -3.929 -9.449∗∗ -14.508 -8.379∗∗∗ -8.806∗∗∗ 16.921
(2.245) (2.923) (4.684) (11.630) (2.864) (1.999) (11.769)
N. obs. 994 851 638 1071 1029 1071 1040
Note: In parenthesis we report standard errors. Statistical significance at ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗10%.










Table 8: Estimation results for patents using additional control variables and G-P index
Patents (applicants)
IPR measure G-P G-P G-P G-P G-P G-P G-P
ln Mit−1 0.914
∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 1.508∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.181) (0.324) (0.146) (0.151) (0.154) (0.172)
ln Mjt−1 0.966
∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 1.099∗∗
(0.213) (0.235) (0.162) (0.336) (0.210) (0.396) (0.305)
ln IPRit -29.429
∗∗ -32.907∗∗ -44.526∗∗∗ -25.369∗∗∗ -26.836∗∗∗ -28.267∗∗ -17.155∗∗
(11.930) (12.870) (8.244) (9.690) (9.470) (12.040) (7.469)
ln IPRjt -3.210
∗∗∗ -2.520∗∗∗ -6.049∗∗∗ -4.185∗∗ -3.943∗∗∗ -2.278∗∗ -3.714∗∗∗































∗∗∗ 1.771∗∗∗ 1.305∗∗∗ 1.566∗∗∗ 1.630∗∗∗ 1.602∗∗∗ 1.794∗∗∗
(0.437) (0.526) (0.418) (0.390) (0.377) (0.418) (0.571)
Constant 36.796∗∗ 39.624∗∗ 55.262∗∗∗ 23.036 33.870∗∗ 35.063∗∗ 37.347∗∗∗
(16.934) (18.733) (7.796) (14.832) (13.310) (17.417) (14.040)
N. obs. 210 203 145 238 238 238 230
Note: In parenthesis we report standard errors. Statistical significance at ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗10%.










Table 9: Estimation results for publications using additional control variables and EOS index
Publications
IPR measure EOS EOS EOS EOS EOS EOS EOS
ln Mit−1 0.214
∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.065) (0.076) (0.083) (0.036) (0.030) (0.065)
ln Mjt−1 0.649
∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.124) (0.049) (0.094) (0.075) (0.166) (0.169)
ln IPRit -0.253 -0.453 -0.708
∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗ -0.285 .238 -0.361
(0.509) (0.501) (0.279) (0.201) (0.293) (0.412) (0.495)
ln IPRjt 0.306 0.503
∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.514∗ 0.542∗∗ 0.370∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗






























∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ .804∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.064) (0.061) (0.091) (0.054) (0.054) (0.077)
Constant -6.425∗∗∗ -7.899∗∗∗ -5.035∗∗∗ -7.950∗∗∗ -7.482∗∗∗ -7.814∗∗∗ -6.221∗∗∗
(2.236) (1.648) (1.273) (1.567) (1.702) (1.722) (0.8723)
N. obs. 1106 941 698 1190 1141 1190 1157
Note: In parenthesis we report standard errors. Statistical significance at ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗10%.









le Table 10: Estimation results for publications using additional control variables and G-P indexPublicationsIPR measure G-P G-P G-P G-P G-P G-P G-P
ln Mit−1 0.197
∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.044) (0.104) (0.066) (0.099) (0.049) (0.069)
ln Mjt−1 0.474
∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.180) (0.156) (0.220) (0.182) (0.160) (0.187)
ln IPRit -2.731
∗∗∗ -2.889∗∗ -0.955 -2.242∗∗∗ -1.941∗∗ -2.402∗∗∗ -2.287∗∗∗
(0.769) (1.152) (1.247) (0.801) (0.818) (0.791) (0.785)
ln IPRjt 0.884
∗∗∗ 1.122∗∗∗ 1.707∗ 1.224∗∗∗ 0.693 1.258∗∗∗ 1.234∗∗∗
































∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ .855∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.046) (0.087) (0.067) (0.054) (0.046) (0.046)
Constant -2.317∗∗∗ -3.719∗∗∗ -6.563∗ -5.479 -4.900∗∗∗ -4.568∗∗∗ -4.212∗∗∗
(0.402) (0.687) (3.388) (3.644) (0.859) (0.455) (0.362)
N. obs. 210 203 145 238 238 238 230
Note: In parenthesis we report standard errors. Statistical significance at ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗10%.










Table 11: Estimation results using various lags of patent protection indices
Patents Publications
(applicants)
IPR measure G-P EOS EOS EOS G-P EOS EOS EOS
ln Mit−1 0.816
∗∗∗ 0.169 0.164 0.171 0.187∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.187) (0.193) (0.192) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.039)
ln Mjt−1 1.008
∗∗∗ 1.044∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ 1.026∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.265) (0.280) (0.288) (0.189) (0.201) (0.199) (0.194)
ln IPRit 1.072 0.136 -0.191 -0.269
(0.723) (0.683) (0.252) (0.221)
ln IPRit−1 -22.811
∗∗ 2.027∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ -0.125 -0.867 -0.260 -0.078 0.071





∗ 0.832∗∗ 0.547∗ 0.504∗
(0.417) (0.408) (0.292) (0.301)
ln IPRjt−1 -3.969
∗∗∗ -0.641 -1.207∗∗ -0.665∗ 1.271∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ -0.164 0.165∗∗∗





∗∗∗ 1.292∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 1.252∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗
(0.447) (0.306) (0.337) (0.310) (0.049) (0.083) (0.082) 0. (0.087)
Constant 27.004∗ -10.440∗∗∗ -11.048∗∗∗ -12.787∗∗∗ -6.871∗∗∗ -7.070∗∗∗ -6.811∗∗∗ -6.807∗∗∗
(15.040) (2.418) (2.782) (2.866) (0.552) (2.127) (2.117) (2.177)
N. obs. 238 952 952 833 238 1190 952 833
Note: Statistical significance at ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
basis of the location of applicants are taken into account.21 As for scientific collaborations (pub-
lications), with few exceptions, the positive effect of stringent IPR in country j is confirmed.
Omitting some negligible cases (i.e. government expenditure on education, sum of pharmaceu-
tical import and export, the role of Internet), the additional control variables included in the
regressions are generally not statistically significant. This may not seem surprising considering
that these variables refer to country-wide phenomena, and not exclusively to the pharmaceutical
industry. As we would expect, commercial proximity between the two countries, as measured
by the Trade variable, is significant only in the case of technological collaborations. This con-
firms indeed how patent collaborations are more frequent between countries that are close trade
partners.
5.3 Various lags of IPR protection indices
As the development process for a new drug involves several stages, including the completion
of complex clinical trials, the period from when the molecule is isolated to the time the drug
21Further regression results are available from the authors upon request.










reaches the market can easily become very long (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). Hence, in this
section we experiment with various lags of the IPR protection indices with the aim to capture
potential delays in the impact of introducing a more stringent protection. We report in Table
11 our results which shown to be consistent with those in our main estimation. We still obtain
that the IPR protection exerts a negative impact on joint patents and a positive effect on joint
publications.
Table 12: Placebo regressions on publications in the field of Economics
Publications
IPR measure EOS G-P G-P









ln IPRit 1.100 -12.624 -12.609
(0.906) (9.264) (9.321)





Constant -6.920∗∗∗ 12.529 12.500
(1.923) (15.220) (15.279)
N. obs. 1190 238 238
Note: Statistical significance at ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5%, ∗10%.
5.4 A placebo regression for publications
As discussed in the introduction, our decision to focus on the pharmaceutical domain was mainly
driven by the high relevance that the level of legal protection for intellectual property is expected
to have for research investments in this specific sector. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude with
certainty that a result similar to what we have obtained might emerge for other sectors, where
IPR protection has in reality no actual influence at all, calling into question the validity of our
identification strategy. One way to exclude the risk of a spurious effect is to run a placebo
regression for a sector in which we expect a priori that no effect should be detected. For this
reason, we perform the same estimation for the case of scientific publications in the field of
economics. Obviously, no patenting is involved in economics research and so the level of IPR










protection cannot influence the amount of collaborations. As Table 12 shows, we do not find
any significant effect on economics publications across all three specifications that differ with
respect to the definition of mass and type of IPR index. Thus, we conclude that we can be
sufficiently confident on the validity of our model identification.22 Moreover, to further reduce
concern about possible endogeneity bias, we make use of economics as an interesting falsification
test.
6 Concluding remarks
Although it is beyond any doubt that the links between cooperative agreements and intellectual
property rights have important dynamic effects, the question whether the normative changes
introduced in the protection of the IPR have reached the expected results is still open to debate.
Our research has been motivated by the global IPR reform introduced in 1995, providing a
unique opportunity to study the effects of strengthening IPR rules. We investigated whether
the evolution in the international cooperation in the pharmaceutical research has changed in
response to a clearer set of institutions designed to defend intellectual property at the world
level. Making use of both a subjective and an objective measure of the level of protection of the
intellectual property, we obtained that a better defined set of rules inhibits collaborative patent
applications but encourages collaborative scientific publications. These results turned out to be
very robust to different specifications, to the inclusion of a large set of different control variables,
and also to a placebo regression that confirms the validity of our identification strategy.
These two apparently contradicting findings can be interpreted in light of the recent studies
that stress the importance of a clearly defined legal system in promoting research collaboration.
Once a solid legal background is in place, the protection offered by patents become less necessary
at an early stage of the research development, while it is more fruitful to provide the researchers
with a larger freedom to take full advantage of the international cooperation. This is particularly
true in a science-based sector, like the pharmaceutical, where the combination patent-publication
is the standard.
However, since the reform of the IPR system is very recent, it would be interesting in the
future to consider a longer time span, along with a wider set of industries and countries, in
order to let countries develop the institutions and capabilities aimed at fostering collaborations
between the developed and the developing world. What emerges from our results is that there is
an important ongoing evolution in the way international research collaborations are coordinated,
in response to a transformation of the institutions that protect the intellectual property. The
implications are that a correct assessment of the effectiveness of a certain legal reform needs to
examine the consequences for the broader outcome of the research process, and especially the
impact for the patent-publication synergy.
22We would like to thank Beata Javorcik for suggesting, among other things, this validation check.
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